Cold War Entanglements,
Third World Solidarities:
Vietnam and Palestine,
1967–75

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Abstract: This is the first study to focus on Vietnam-Palestine relations from 1967 to 1975. In American foreign policy, Vietnam and Palestine became entangled via their allegedly shared susceptibility to Soviet influence. Such Cold War entanglements, however, had to contend with an emerging Third World movement of decolonial, anti-racist, pro-Indigenous solidarities, critical of the imperialist nature of both the US and the USSR. Using these two frames—Cold War entanglements and Third World solidarities—I trace the usage of “Vietnam” and “Palestine” as grounded, rhetorical signifiers, demonstrating how different actors co-constituted their own political positions in relation to these two capacious terms. The article ends with an interview with the Ambassador of the State of Palestine in Vietnam, Saadi Salama, theorizing how the past’s Cold War, Third World Liberation period continues to haunt the present. Invoking Neferti Tadiar’s concept of “divine sorrow,” I suggest that an entanglement of temporalities has the potential to re-chart the political possibilities of those nation-states that have seemingly concluded their own national revolutions, such as Vietnam.

Keywords: Vietnam, Palestine, solidarity, Cold War, Third World Liberation

Résumé : Cette étude est la première à prendre pour objet les relations entre le Vietnam et la Palestine, de 1967 à 1975. La politique étrangère des États-Unis a amalgamé le Vietnam et la Palestine en leur attribuant une commune et supposée vulnérabilité à l’influence soviétique. Mais les amalgames de ce genre, typiques de la guerre froide, ont dû se mesurer, dans le tiers-monde, au mouvement émergent des solidarités décolonialistes, antiracistes et proautochtones critiques de l’impérialisme—celui des États-Unis aussi bien que celui de l’URSS. En m’appuyant sur ces deux notions—amalgames de la guerre froide et solidarités tiers-mondistes —, je décris l’usage des mots « Vietnam » et « Palestine » en tant que signifiants rhétoriques motivés, et je montre comment des acteurs différents ont coconstitué...
leur position politique respective en relation à ces deux termes très vastes. L'article se termine par une entrevue de l’ambassadeur de l’État de Palestine au Vietnam, Saadi Salama, et par un exposé théorique sur la manière dont la Guerre froide et la libération du tiers-monde, événements du passé, continuent de hanter le présent. En m’appuyant sur le concept de « chagrin divin » élaboré par Neferti Tadiar, je soutiens que l’amalgame des temporalités permet de redessiner la carte des possibles politiques des États-nations qui, comme le Vietnam, semblent en avoir terminé avec leur révolution nationale.

Mots clés : Vietnam, Palestine, solidarité, guerre froide, libération du tiers-monde

“When in Palestine, if you say you are a Vietnamese, you will be welcome as a distinguished guest. For those in the land that is still in search of independence, the two words ‘Viet Nam’ have become a symbol of struggling spirit for the national sacred peace.”

—Saadi Salama, Ambassador of the State of Palestine in Vietnam (“VN Push”)

In 1993, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam established diplomatic relations with the State of Israel, initiating social, economic, and military ties between the two countries. In 1994, Israel opened an embassy in Hanoi, and in 2010, Vietnam reciprocated with its own embassy in Tel Aviv.1 Israeli Agriculture Minister Haim Oron invited Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister Nguyễn Công Tấn to Israel in 1999, and President Simon Peres paid an official visit to Vietnam in 2011. In 2013, the two countries created the Intergovernmental Commission on Cooperation in Economics, Trade, Science, Technology, and Other Fields.2 Vietnam currently sends thousands of agricultural students to Israel each year to learn how Israelis cultivate the arid landscape, inadvertently reproducing the Zionist fiction of terra nullius: the idea that Palestine was a barren land free for Jewish settlement.3 Importantly, Vietnam buys military weapons from Israeli contractors, bypassing the pre-2016 US arms embargo (Cohen; “Vietnam Buys”). Exchange trade between the two countries has increased rapidly in recent years, from $219 million in 2008 to $1.061 billion in 2014 (Nguyễn, personal interview).

Vietnam’s contemporary diplomatic relations with Israel are entangled, however, with its longer history of solidarity with Palestine—a land settled and a people displaced by the very foundation of Israel as a Zionist state in 1948, a “catastrophe” commemorated by
Palestinians as *al-Nakba*. In 1968, at the height of both the Cold War and the Third World Liberation movement, Vietnam established relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the official authority charged with co-ordinating Palestinian resistance against Israeli settler colonial occupation. In 1976, one year after the reunification of Vietnam under Communist rule, the PLO opened a resident representative office in Hanoi. This office was upgraded to an embassy in 1988, when Vietnam became one of the first nations to recognize Palestine as an independent state. More recently, Vietnam joined countries around the world in recognizing 2014 as an International Year of Solidarity with the Palestinian People (IYSPP), in accordance with United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/68/12. Government-sponsored groups such as the Hanoi Union of Friendship Organizations, the Vietnam-Palestine Friendship Association of Hanoi, and the Embassy of the State of Palestine in Vietnam organized events in major Vietnamese cities to commemorate the occasion: a cultural dance show featuring performers dressed in traditional Vietnamese áo dài and the Palestinian black-and-white keffiyeh, a handful of documentary film screenings, a Friendship Tennis Tournament, and speeches from prominent government officials. For example, in December 2014, Hồ Anh Dũng, chairman of the Vietnam Committee of Solidarity with the Palestinian People, read a “Message of Solidarity” on behalf of then-President Trương Tấn Sang, re-affirming the Vietnamese State’s “strong support for the just cause and the fundamental rights of the Palestinian people” (“Ceremony in Commemoration”).

Vietnam’s contemporary declarations of solidarity with Palestine thus coexist—seemingly paradoxically—with its increasing diplomatic relations with Israel: a state that continues to discriminate against Palestinian residents, build settlements in the occupied West Bank, restrict access to fresh water in Gaza, and deny the right of return to millions of Palestinian refugees. In order to unpack this political paradox and historicize Vietnam’s 2014 celebration of IYSPP, this article charts its forgotten antecedent: an earlier moment of Third World solidarity between Vietnam and Palestine from 1967—the year of the June Six-Day War, in which Israel initiated its occupation of Gaza and the West Bank (as well as the Sinai Peninsula, which it later rescinded, and the Golan Heights, the western portion of which remains occupied), and the year that the US significantly intensified its long-standing support of Israel—to 1975—the year that the Vietnam War (alternatively called the American War in Vietnam) ended with the United States’ defeat and the Communists’
unification of the country. During this period, American Cold War ideologies projected a particular mapping of the world: one neatly divided into geopolitical spaces of democracy versus autocracy, free-market liberalism versus Communism, the US versus the USSR. In American foreign policy, Vietnam and Palestine became entangled via their allegedly shared susceptibility to Soviet influence. Such Cold War entanglements, however, had to contend with an emerging Third World movement of decolonial, anti-racist, pro-Indigenous solidarities, critical of the imperialist nature of both the US and the USSR. These solidarities—demonstrations of political support and acknowledgements of a common struggle—took multiple forms: rhetorical overtures, arms exchanges, financial transactions, and diplomatic relations. Using these two frames—Cold War entanglements and Third World solidarities—I trace alliances of collaboration and co-optation, conflicts of ideology and geopolitical competition, that connected not only Vietnam and Palestine but also Israel, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Communist China. My focus on the 1967–75 period is contextualized by a longer history of Vietnam’s shifting relationships with pre-1948 Zionists in search of a nation-state, post-1948 Palestinian freedom fighters, and then post-1993 (post-Oslo)7 Israeli business partners. These shifts can partly be attributed to Vietnam’s own changing political status: as a French colony from 1887 to 1954, a divided country at war from 1954 to 1975, and then a unified Communist state post-1975. Rather than take “Vietnam” and “Palestine” as stable, ahistorical entities, I trace their usage as grounded, rhetorical signifiers, demonstrating how different political actors—US foreign policy makers, Soviet Union officials, non-aligned heads of state, Black Americans, student activists, and leaders of the Vietnamese and Palestinian liberation movements themselves—co-constituted their own political positions in relation to these two capacious terms. In sum, this article traces the “knotted itineraries” of Vietnam and Palestine—imagined alternatively as countries, peoples, struggles, and symbols of revolution—from 1967 to 1975: entangled histories of emergent solidarities during an era of Cold War imperialism and Third World Liberation (Manjapra 13).

Previous scholarly accounts of this period have largely separated Vietnam and Palestine into two distinct areas of study.8 This decoupling is shaped in part by the historical moment: in public speeches during this period, US officials de-linked the two spaces, hoping to suppress parallel critiques of US intervention in Southeast Asia and
the Middle East and to discredit transnational expressions of solidarity. For example, in a 1972 speech, Senator George McGovern denied “any hint of similarity”: “because we made a mistake in backing a corrupt dictatorship in Saigon is no reason at all to deny our economic, diplomatic and political help to the free and independent state of Israel” (McGovern qtd. in IDP 1972 178; emphasis added). But this decoupling is due, as well, to the academy’s division of the world into area studies—itself a Cold War project of knowledge production—which posits “Vietnam” and “Palestine” as two “discretely bounded objects” of analysis with “isolated origins and independent progressive development” (Lowe 6). E Even Asian American Studies, which in its diasporic turn has probed the “intimacies” between different continents, has only recently begun to reconsider the Middle East as part of West Asia and thus a fruitful site for relational analysis (see Lowe; Maira and Shihade; Rana and Fujino). Likewise, the interdisciplinary field of transnational American Studies, which seeks to “decenter the United States and analyze its centralized imperial power,” often limits its study of empire to the US and one “other” (Kaplan 12). Instead, this article charts political entanglements and demonstrations of solidarity between Vietnam and Palestine that have been structured both by and in spite of US imperialism. By discussing Vietnam and Palestine in relation to each other and other non-aligned states, and not only in opposition to the US or the USSR, I call attention to South-South relations: the exchange of political knowledge, military strategy, and solidarity rhetoric between countries of the Global South during the Cold War, Third World Liberation period.

This is the first study to focus on Vietnam-Palestine relations from 1967 to 1975. I supplement existing secondary literature on Cold War, Third World international politics with original archival research conducted at the Institute of Palestine Studies (IPS) in Ramallah during the summer of 2016. I rely heavily on the International Documents on Palestine (IDP), annual anthologies of reprinted newspaper articles, public speeches, and United Nations documents pertaining to Palestine’s relations with other countries and political groups in a given year. Collated and published by the IPS, these anthologies are subject to IPS’s archival choices of inclusion and omission. However, as Derrida has taught us, are not all archives political projects of a given state? And if we must inevitably choose which state archive, which historical narrative, to engage, why not choose that of Palestine, a nation whose history has been brutally erased by Zionist narratives of terra nullius? Indeed, in the face of
Israel’s current denial of Palestinian sovereignty in the form of a political state, the IPS archive functions as a performance of sovereignty that prefigures an independent state—one that attempts to enact state claims to authority regarding a contested history. Given previous scholarship’s overwhelming elision of Palestine’s narration of its own internationalist history, I here highlight IPS’s archival choices, cross-referencing and supplementing these texts with other newspaper clippings, public speeches, and government documents from this time period.¹⁴

The Cold War entanglements and Third World solidarities of the 1967–75 period continue to reverberate in the globalized, neoliberal present: a post–Đô i Mới, post-Oslo moment of Vietnamese free-market liberalism and curtailed Palestinian authority.¹⁵ Addressing the apparent paradox that opened this article—Vietnam’s continued declarations of solidarity with Palestine in light of its increasing diplomatic relations with Israel—I conclude with an extended interview with the Ambassador of the State of Palestine in Vietnam, Saadi Salama, who is one of the main proponents of such declarations. Today, Vietnam has joined a growing trend of formerly non-aligned countries in the Global South, such as India, that have normalized relations with Israel, substituting a more radical politics of Third World revolution for a liberal ideology of humanitarianism and diplomacy.¹⁶ Echoing the United Nations’ imperative to work toward a two-state solution, these countries see little contradiction—only economic incentive—in developing ties with both Israel and Palestine simultaneously, even as they publicly denounce Israel’s occupation of the disputed territories. Furthermore, following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the solidification of the US as the reigning superpower, these countries increasingly seek to exchange their formerly non-aligned positions in favour of partnership with the United States. And recognizing the centrality of Israel to US foreign policy—Israel is, after all, the largest cumulative recipient of US foreign aid since World War II—one way that these countries attempt to curry favour with the US is by cooperating with Israel while only nominally supporting Palestine, controversially projecting that “the best way to get to Washington [is] through Tel Aviv” (Prashad, “India’s Reckless Road”).

And yet, Vietnam’s contemporary relations with Palestine cannot be reduced to mere economic expediency or rhetorical flourish. In the epigraph that opened this piece, Ambassador Saadi Salama
emphasized the continued symbolic importance of “Vietnam” to Palestinian freedom fighters: “For those in the land that is still in search of independence, the two words ‘Viet Nam’ have become a symbol of struggling spirit for the national sacred peace” (“VN Push”). I argue, however, that the “Vietnam” that Salama imagines and calls forth when he talks about Vietnam-Palestine solidarity in 2014 is less the contemporary neo-liberal State of Vietnam than it is the pre-1975 ideal imaged by revolutionary leader Hồ Chí Minh—an ideal that was perhaps foreclosed rather than realized with the establishment of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in 1975. Drawing from Neferti Tadiar’s concept of “divine sorrow,” which refuses the Vietnamese State’s teleology of total victory in order to dwell with the residual affective ghosts of the painful war-torn past, I suggest that this entanglement of temporalities—1967–75 with 2014—has the potential to not only highlight the ongoing struggle for Palestinian liberation in the present, but also re-chart the political possibilities of those nation-states that have seemingly concluded their own national revolutions, such as Vietnam.

Cold War Entanglements: US Foreign Policy in Vietnam and the Middle East

In American Cold War history, the “Vietnamese–Middle Eastern connection” has been “effectively buried,” due in part to government interest (Klinghoffer 2). International relations scholar Judith Klinghoffer argues that both the US and the Soviet Union were embarrassed by their foreign policies in Vietnam and the Middle East during the Cold War and subsequently “vociferously reject[ed] any relationship between the two conflicts” (2). Whereas the “American policy makers were widely criticized for permitting their preoccupation with Vietnam to lead to the neglect of the Middle East” and later were “constantly accused of being willing to sacrifice Israeli interests on the altar of an advantageous exit from Vietnam,” the Soviets “were accused of inciting the Arabs to war, and then ‘selling them out’” (2). During the 1967–75 period, however, comparisons between Vietnam and the Middle East—including Palestine—dominated US foreign policy. Subscribing to a “Cold War logics and epistemology,” in which American foreign policy was driven by an objective of socialist/communist containment, US officials used the threat of Soviet expansion to justify imperialist intervention into these two regions (Kim 9).
In contrast to Third World solidarity, Cold War entanglement as a frame is defined less by mutual connections than by racialized hierarchies of attachment. In the late 1960s following the Têt Offensive, US officials debated whether to de-escalate the unpopular war in Vietnam in order to pivot military resources to the Soviet Union’s growing influence in the Middle East, driven in no small part by a calculation of each region’s comparative utility for expanding US hegemony and wealth.\(^{17}\) For example, in “We Should De-escalate the Importance of Vietnam,” published in the *New York Times* on 21 December 1969, George W. Ball, former Under Secretary of State (1961–66) and US Ambassador to the United Nations (1968), discredits President Eisenhower’s 1954 domino theory, arguing that the US need not continue its war in Vietnam in order to curb the spread of Communism to the rest of Southeast Asia. Dismissing Vietnam as an “area of marginal strategic importance” and belittling American commitments to the South Vietnamese army and their vision for a democratic Vietnam, Ball argued that the US should instead turn its attention to the Middle East (35). In “Suez Is the Front to Watch,” published half a year later, Ball uses stark Cold War calculation to defend his titular thesis, dispensing with the liberal rhetoric of “democracy” and “freedom” more often used by politicians during this period to justify US intervention abroad. While South Vietnam has “little significance for either economic or geographic reasons,” he argues, the Middle East is “an economic prize of extraordinary value,” an “area of concentrated American investment,” that “does lie near the center of world power”—what he identifies as “Central and Western Europe” (62; original emphasis). For Ball, a strategic plan of US imperialism would lead to capitalist expansion and increased wealth.

A shift toward the Middle East would also appease the increasingly vocal Jewish American contingent of voters, who criticized the American War in Vietnam but advocated greater US intervention in defence of Israel, following the 1967 Six-Day War. These liberal voters, identified ironically by Klinghoffer as “Hoves and Dawks” (155), sought to rhetorically disentangle Vietnam from the Middle East in order to justify their seemingly contradictory anti–Vietnam War, pro–Middle East interventionist position. But their performance of what Edward Said has critiqued as “moral acrobatics” instead elucidates the vexed entanglement between American liberal ideology and Zionist settler colonialism in Palestine, which represents Israel as the “only [Western] democracy in the Middle East” (97).\(^{18}\) For American strategists like Ball, however, the interests of Israel, like
that of Vietnam, were actually secondary to the United States’ Cold War competition with the Soviet Union, suggesting that Israel could at any time be abandoned, as the US had abandoned South Vietnam. For example, although Ball pays lip-service to US support for Israel’s “efforts to realize for the Jewish people their ancient dream of a national home,” he later implies Israel’s security is incidental to America’s Cold War interests (“Suez” 63). Indeed, given domestic weariness regarding US wars abroad—exemplified by the mass protests against, and increased lack of congressional support for, the Vietnam War—Ball advises the Nixon administration to frame the need for US intervention into the Middle East not as an “action to defend Israel from destruction at Arab hands” but rather as one to “prevent the Soviet Union from using Arab surrogate armies to extend its dominion over the Middle East” (63). In doing so, he suggests that Americans are less interested in shedding blood on behalf of the “liberty” of small nations like South Vietnam or Israel than they are with combatting the perceived threat of Soviet domination and nuclear fallout. In a television interview conducted a week after the publication of Ball’s article, President Nixon concurs with Ball’s analysis, admitting that the situation in the Middle East is “more dangerous,” and by extension, more important, than the situation in Vietnam, given the potential “collision of the superpowers” (Nixon qtd. in IDP 1970 198). Like Ball, Nixon’s support for Israel, and his subsequent abandonment of the South Vietnamese cause, has as much if not more to do with maintaining “U.S. interests” and the “balance of power” than it does with supporting the Zionist project and addressing American Jews’ concerns (197). This raises the question: once American interests shift away from the region, would the US abandon Israel, as it had abandoned South Vietnam (Soffer)? Thus, although liberal rhetoric underwrites Zionist narratives, liberal Jewish Americans perhaps have reason to be wary of US foreign aid to Israel, both during the Cold War period and today—a wariness that could in turn spark further interrogation and criticism of the policies of Palestinian dispossession upheld by such gifts of foreign aid.

Although American Cold War policy post-1967 drew comparisons between democratic initiatives in Israel and South Vietnam, prior to 1967, many progressive Israelis actually identified more with the North Vietnamese cause.19 History thus offers anti-imperialist Jews, both in Israel and in the diaspora, alternative models of solidarity. By December 1965, anti-war demonstrations in support of the Vietnamese liberation struggle had broken out in Jerusalem
and Tel Aviv (Klinghoffer 70). Many Israelis empathized with the North Vietnamese, because as survivors and descendants of the Holocaust, they too saw themselves as victims of Western persecution, struggling to maintain their own precarious nation-state. Radical leftist Knesset member Uri Avery compared the American killing of Vietnamese freedom fighters to the German slaughter of Holocaust Jews (qtd. in Klinghoffer 70). Israel’s political elite, raised in the European socialist tradition, “felt closer” to Hồ Chí Minh, the North Vietnamese Communist leader, than to Nguyễn Cao Kỳ, prime minister of South Vietnam from 1965 to 1967 (Klinghoffer 70). In fact, Zionist leader David Ben-Gurion had befriended Hồ Chí Minh in 1946, when the two lived in the same Paris hotel. Before the Zionist establishment of Israel in 1948, Hồ had suggested that Ben-Gurion establish a Jewish government in exile, headquartered in Hanoi. Returning the sentiment of solidarity, Ben-Gurion asserted in 1966, “If I were the American President, I would have pulled out the American army from Vietnam, even though such a move might possibly have grave consequences” (qtd. in Klinghoffer 70). As a displaced Jew, Ben-Gurion identified with Hồ’s aspirations for a liberated nation-state. Once Ben-Gurion’s nationalist aspirations became manifest as a settler colonial project, however, Hồ distanced his own Vietnamese revolution, aligning instead with the emergent Third World Liberation movement, which articulated solidarity along decolonial, anti-racist, pro-Indigenous lines, embracing a politics that disavowed the Zionist theft of Palestinian lands.

Israel’s Cold War entanglement with South Vietnam over North Vietnam solidified in 1966, when popular Israeli military leader Moshe Dayan decided to tour South Vietnam to study US counter-insurgency tactics. Israeli leftists, foreign officials, and American anti-war activists interpreted the trip as a deliberate move to align Israel with the US and, by extension, against North Vietnam, Palestine, and the Soviet Union in the Cold War order (Chamberlin 33; Klinghoffer 71; McAlister 157; Pennock 96). The following year, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol named Dayan the Minister of Defense, tasked with maintaining security in the newly occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza, where Dayan put his new-found counter-insurgency intelligence to use. As US support for Israel increased post-1967, exemplified by the sale of Phantom jets used in the Vietnam War to Israel in 1968 (Bard), Palestinians and other non-aligned nations projected the US war against North Vietnam onto Israel’s own politics. By the following decade, this shift had solidified: in a 1974 speech at the United Nations General Assembly’s
2,282nd meeting, Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO, denounced Israel’s “backing of South Viet-Nam against the Viet-Namese revolution” (Arafat, “Statement” qtd. in IDP 1974 134). Dismissing the Israeli left’s prior support of (North) Vietnamese national independence, Palestine and non-aligned nations of the emerging Third World Liberation movement accused Israel of supporting the United States’ proxy war in Vietnam.

**Third World Solidarities: Connected Critiques of Western Imperialism**

Although US foreign policy drew implicit connections between Vietnam and Palestine by targeting Soviet influence in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, it would be up to other historical actors to articulate Third World solidarity between Vietnam and Palestine. Uncovering these Third World solidarities thus requires a move from an American archive of newspapers and political speeches to IPS’s archive of Palestinian internationalist history. In the texts above, neither Ball nor Nixon explicitly acknowledges the Palestinians. Ball refers to “the refugees” as one problem preventing Israel and the Arab states from “reaching a settlement” (“Suez” 62), and Nixon characterizes the “fedayeen”—Palestinian freedom fighters—as “superradicals” that make the Middle East conflict a “very difficult situation” (Nixon qtd. in IDP 1970 197). But neither admits the fact that Palestinians have their own independent political stake in the conflict, with their own unique grievances against Zionist settlement and occupation of their land. In contrast, following the Six-Day War of 1967, many non-Western nations—the Soviet Union, China, and non-aligned states such as Syria, Yugoslavia, and Algeria—used the analytic of “Western imperialism” to draw connections between the North Vietnamese and Arab nationalist struggles. Some actors, such as the Soviet Union, focused on Egypt’s, Syria’s, and Jordan’s territorial losses at the hand of Israel, while others, such as China, identified the Palestinians’ particular grievances more explicitly. All condemned the US and Israel as imperialist forces, though how they defined the relationship between the US and Israel differed based on their political orientation.

Some non-Western actors characterized the US and Israel as independent political actors who nonetheless co-ordinated their imperialist attacks. For example, in a Joint Communiqué in Damascus in August 1968, the Ba’th Party of Syria and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union declared that “the Zionist-imperialist aggression
against the Arab countries and the American imperialist aggression against the people of Vietnam arise from an over-all imperialist plan,” which “constitute[s] a danger to world peace and the security of all peoples” (Ba’th Party of Syria and Communist Party of the Soviet Union qtd. in IDP 1968 115). By identifying an “over-all imperialist plan” that threatened the “security of all peoples,” they rhetorically drew connections between not only Vietnam and Palestine but also anti-imperialist and anti-colonial struggles in Cuba, Cambodia, Laos, South Africa, Rhodesia, and elsewhere. Similarly, in a statement following the Israeli attack on Karameh, Jordan, in March 1968, the Soviet government took the opportunity to condemn not only Israel’s “continuing aggression against neighboring Arab states,” but also the United States’ intervention in Vietnam, drawing parallels between the two “aggressive imperialist forces” by identifying their common objective: “to strike a blow at the national liberation movement and its advanced detachments” (Soviet Union Government qtd. in IDP 1968 41; emphasis added).

By naming a common enemy of Western imperialism, the Soviet Union identified a single global “national liberation movement,” short-circuiting the geographic distance between the Middle East and Vietnam. Such declarations were also self-interested, however: invoking a Cold War framework, the Soviet Union implied its own position as leader of the Third World Liberation movement.

Other political actors argued that Israel was just a proxy for American imperialist interests in the Middle East. For example, a May 1969 appeal by the Executive Secretariat of the Afro-Asian-Latin American Peoples’ Solidarity Organization to “Support the Arab and Palestinian Peoples’ Struggle against Israel’s Aggression,” directed at “all Revolutionary Forces and Socialist Countries,” characterized “Israel’s acts of aggression and crimes” as part of “a plan drawn up by the imperialist powers which stand behind Israel and goad it on,” foremost among them being “American imperialism, which uses Israel to protect its economic, military and political interest in this part of the world” (Executive Secretariat of the Afro-Asian-Latin American Peoples’ Solidarity Organization qtd. in IDP 1969 92). For countries outside of the Middle East, US imperialism presented a much more immediate threat than Israeli aggression; they thus enfolded their condemnation of Israeli aggression into a larger Cold War critique of US foreign intervention. Such rhetorical statements deny Israel’s own complex history and agency, eliding important differences between Israel and the US: although the US did indeed offer military and financial aid to Israel.
at the expense of the Palestinian liberation struggle, Zionists who hoped to create an independent Jewish state, particularly in the aftermath of the Holocaust—even though this state was predicated upon the further displacement and dispossession of another group, the native Palestinians—did not consider Israel a mere lackey of some US imperialist “plan.” Nonetheless, for many non-aligned countries such as Yugoslavia, the “connection between the Middle East and Far East” was “quite clear: in our opinion the United States is responsible for both these crisis [sic]” (Tito qtd. in IDP 1968 23–4). In a 1974 interview, President Boumediene of Algeria likewise insists that “problems” in Vietnam and Palestine “are identical,” wondering out loud how “Zionist propaganda [could] have secured the silence of the world” when this same world “opposed the American presence in Vietnam” (Boumediene qtd. in IDP 1974 390). Although Zionism echoed some of the postcolonial non-aligned rhetoric of national independence, Israel’s sovereignty was built upon settler colonial foundations, aligning Israel more with the United States than with the anti-colonial, pro-Indigenous Third World Liberation movement.

Although a Cold War framework simplistically pits Communism and authoritarianism against capitalism and liberal democracy, Communist interests were far from homogenous. Wary of the Soviet Union’s unchecked rise to power over the Communist world, in June 1968, China published an article in the Peking Review accusing “the Soviet revisionist renegade clique” for “working hand in glove” with “U.S. imperialism” to push through “a so-called ‘political settlement’ of the Middle East question in an attempt to force the Arab countries to an all-around capitulation to the US-Israeli aggressors” (“U.S.-Soviet Conspiracy” qtd. in IDP 1968 89). Crediting the continual “awakening” of Palestinian consciousness to “Mao Tse-tung’s thought”—a claim that denied a longer history of Indigenous Palestinian resistance against first the Ottoman Empire, then British colonialists, then Israeli Zionists—China critiqued UN resolutions that would “coerce[e] the Arab countries into unilaterally accepting a ‘cease-fire’” that would delegitimize the Palestinian armed uprising led by Yasser Arafat and his political party, Fatah (89–90). Although such a statement reveals the interregional competition for power that underwrote Cold War arguments critiquing Western imperialism, it also importantly disaggregates the Palestinian liberation struggle from the larger Arab conflict with Israel. While states like Jordan and Egypt might settle for a US-brokered peace with Israel in exchange for inclusion into Western capitalist markets, Palestinian freedom fighters could not afford to give up
the fight for their stolen homeland. Furthermore, this statement exposes the ideological factions within the diverse Palestinian Liberation Organization. Although some leftist parties of the larger umbrella PLO, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), drew inspiration from Maoism, others drifted toward other ideologies of Marxism, Indigenous resistance, and national liberation.23

Some political statements dispensed with Cold War rhetoric, calling out the racial dimensions of imperialism in order to articulate a more tangible transnational solidarity from below. In the 1940s, prior to the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, prominent Black leaders such as W.E.B. DuBois had encouraged Black Americans to support Zionism, drawing comparisons between the African independence movement and the Jewish fight for a homeland. However, by the 1970s, Black American leaders aligned with the Vietnamese and Palestinian liberation struggles, connecting a “permanent state of war” against domestic people of colour with the United States’ intervention in Southeast Asia and the Middle East (Feldman, Shadow 59–101; Feldman, “Representing” 193–231; Lubin 111–41). For example, in an advertisement featured in the 1 November 1970 issue of the New York Times, the Committee of Black Americans for Truth about the Middle East expressed “complete solidarity with our Palestinian brothers and sisters, who like us, are struggling for self-determination and an end to racist oppression” (“An Appeal” qtd. in IDP 1970 364).24 Importantly, this group connected America’s “support for King Hussein’s slaughter of Palestinian refugees and freedom-fighters” with its “support of reactionary dictatorships throughout the world” such as in “Cambodia and Vietnam” (364). As in the above Peking Review article, they identified both “Zionists and Arab reactionaries” as aiding “American Imperialism” (364; emphasis added). Unlike the previous statements cited above, however, this one critiqued not only US support for Israeli settler occupation but also Israel’s support for “United States policies of aggression in Southeast Asia, policies that are responsible for the death and wounding of thousands of black youths” (365). By pinpointing how Western imperialism affected all their communities differentially, this group weaved threads of solidarity between Vietnamese freedom fighters, Palestinian fedayeen, and disenfranchised Black Americans sent off to war.

Leftist student groups and academic activists in the US also identified Third World solidarities between Vietnam, Palestine, and
domestic people of colour. Following the Six-Day War of 1967, the Organization of Arab Students endorsed resolutions not only promoting Palestinian independence and Arab unity but also declaring solidarity with African Americans and the National Liberation Front. Recognizing the linked struggles, they proclaimed, “Our battle is an inseparable part of the imperialistic design being executed against the dynamic revolutionary forces in the Third World” (qtd. in Pennock 56). Likewise, the 1969 convention resolution of the Association of Arab American University Graduates (AAUG) drew explicit connections between the “Palestinian Revolution” and the “just cause of the people of Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Black Community in the U.S.” (qtd. in Pennock 35). In his presidential address the same year, Ibrahim Abu-Lughold further emphasized, “We stand united with our Black Brothers in the United States, South Africa, Rhodesia and in Mozambique and Angola; we stand united with the gallant fighters of Vietnam and with all other groups valiantly struggling against all manifestations of human struggle” (qtd. in Pennock 35). Echoing these sentiments, Naseer Aruri, a founding member of AAUG, recalls in his memoir, “We perceived our own struggle for emancipation in the Arab world in the same context of the anti-colonialist movement in Vietnam and the struggle for equality in the United States. We often considered our movement as part and parcel of the fight for third world liberation” (38). Promoting Third World solidarity on college campuses, student groups such as the Arab Student Association, the Tri-Continental Progressive Student Committee, the Liberation Support Movement at the University of California-Berkeley, and the Anti-Imperialist Movement at Columbia University organized film screenings and teach-ins drawing connections between Vietnam and Palestine, and passed out leaflets with slogans such “Vietnam-Palestine One Struggle” and “Southeast Asians Struggle for Independence, Palestinians Struggle for Freedom, G.I.s Struggle for Liberty” (Pennock 59–60, 97). In Communiqué #4, released following the successful jail-break of Dr. Timothy Leary in 1970, Weather Underground, a militant left-wing organization originally founded at the University of Michigan-Ann Arbor, declared that

[w]ith the NLF [National Liberation Front] and the North Vietnamese, with the Democrats for the Liberation of Palestine and Al Fatah, with Rap Brown and Angela Davis, with all black and brown revolutionaries, the Soledad brothers and all prisoners of war in Amerikan [sic] concentration camps we know that peace is only possible with the destruction of U.S. imperialism. (Dohrn)
Like the organizations discussed above, Weather Underground identified US imperialism as the common agent linking diverse struggles against racialized oppression in Vietnam, Palestine, and the Americas, articulating a global Third World solidarity.

**Direct Addresses: Vietnam to Palestine, Palestine to Vietnam**

Discourses of solidarity were produced not only about but also by Vietnamese and Palestinian freedom fighters between 1967 and 1975. In the spring of 1967, prominent Palestinian resistance poet Samih al-Qasim—one of the hundreds of thousands of Palestinians who did not flee in 1948 but rather remained in the State of Israel as a second-class citizen, unable to access the full citizenship rights afforded to Jews in the Zionist state and yet granted the luxury of a national passport—translated half a dozen quatrains of Hồ Chí Minh’s *Prison Diary* poetry from an English copy into Arabic for the popular Israeli Arabic-language publication *al-Jadid*. Drawing attention to “the parallel fates of political prisoners both at home and around the world,” Qasim not only highlighted the routine incarceration of Palestinians in Israeli prisons, but also suggested that living under Zionist martial law in Israel (which lasted until 1966) was akin to imprisonment in itself (Nassar 88). Qasim’s own poetry also invoked the Vietnamese liberation struggle, drawing parallels with the Palestinian revolution. In “From a Revolutionary in the East” (1964), he writes the following:

> From a revolutionary in the East
> to revolutionaries lighting up the darkness
> to fellow revolutionaries, wherever they are
> in the Nile, in the Congo, in Vietnam.
> …
> My brothers! With blood you write
> your history—and headlines!25

Locating himself squarely in the “East,” Qasim subverts Western colonial distinctions between the “Far” and “Near” East and thus imagines stronger geopolitical connections between Vietnam and Palestine. He also perceives Third World revolutionaries as historical actors, capable of writing their own history and headlines via armed guerrilla warfare, instead of mere reactionaries to US and USSR Cold War manoeuvres.
Caught in their own struggle against imperial aggression, Palestinian fedayeen identified with Vietnamese revolutionaries and thus included declarations condemning US imperialism in Vietnam in their public speeches and political platforms. But they also, like other decolonization movements around the world, drew inspiration from Vietnam. Following General Võ Nguyên Giáp’s unexpected victory over the French colonists in the 1954 Battle of Điện Biên Phủ, Palestinian soldiers often took on the nickname “Giap” (Talhami). Based on subsequent Vietnamese successes in holding off American troops, the leftist PFLP concluded that the guerrilla warfare “course adopted by Vietnam and Cuba is the only way in which underdeveloped countries can triumph and overcome the scientific and technological superiority of imperialism and neocolonialism” (“Statement of Basic Policy” qtd. in IDP 1968 424). Recognizing that they could not compete with US-backed Israeli military superiority on its own terms, Palestinian fedayeen declared a people’s war, encouraging workers and peasants most vulnerable to “the oppressive exploitation process exercised by world imperialism and its allies in our homeland” to take up arms (“Political Strategy” qtd. in IDP 1969 610). PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat, the iconic leader of militant resistance for many years, affirmed as well the “firm relationship between the Palestinian revolution and the Vietnam revolution through the experience provided to us by the heroic people of Vietnam and their mighty revolution” (Arafat, “Press Interview” qtd. in IDP 1970 829). In 1966, Abu Jihad of the Fatah party visited Vietnam, and over the following years, Arafat sent several groups of Palestinian soldiers to train in Vietnam and learn Vietnamese guerrilla tactics (Talhami). In March 1970, Arafat himself flew with a delegation of Palestinian liberation fighters to Hanoi to visit Hồ Chí Minh and General Võ Nguyên Giáp. During their meeting, the latter told Arafat that “[t]he Vietnamese and Palestinian people have much in common, just like two people suffering the same illness” (qtd. in Chamberlin 1). Giáp thus connected the Vietnamese and Palestinian liberation struggles, positioning them against the common enemy of Western imperialism (“In Pictures”).

The fedayeen imagined turning the Middle East into a “Second Vietnam,” and one of the surrounding Arab capitals, such as Amman or Beirut, into an “Arab Hanoi,” which would then serve as a centre for revolutionary action based on the Vietnamese liberationist model (qtd. in Chamberlin 26). Capitalizing on American anxiety regarding an impending military defeat in Vietnam, the Palestinian
Commando Organizations released a statement on 9 August 1970 declaring, “We must make the Middle East a second Vietnam to defeat Zionism and imperialism and to liberate completely the soil of the Palestinian and Arab homeland” (“Statement of Palestinian” qtd. in IDP 1970 888). Such a statement emerged out of the solidifying Third World Liberation solidarities, exemplified by the Bandung Conference of 1955 and the Non-Aligned Movement initiated in 1961, which defined strategic alliances between Vietnam, Palestine, and other Third World nations against the warring Eastern and Western blocs. At the 1973 Tenth World Festival of Youth and Students in East Berlin, the PLO was invited to take up the “banner of the global struggle” from Vietnamese freedom fighters, whose struggle was thought to have concluded after the signing of the 1973 Paris Peace Accords ending direct US military combat in Vietnam (qtd. in Chamberlin 175). With North Vietnam’s victory against US imperialism seemingly secured, the Third World Liberation movement turned its attention to the next major anti-imperialist struggle: Palestine. Reflecting on the event, Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish reports that “[i]n the conscience of the peoples of the world, the torch has been passed from Vietnam to us” (qtd. in Chamberlin 176).

In turn, Vietnamese freedom fighters expressed support for the Palestinian struggle. North Vietnam and the PLO established ties in 1968. In a message to the International Conference for the Support of Arab Peoples held in Cairo on 24 January 1969, Hồ Chí Minh, who could not attend in person, asserted that the “Vietnamese people vehemently condemn the Israeli aggressors” and “fully support the Palestinian people’s liberation movement and the struggle of the Arab people for the liberation of territories occupied by Israeli forces” (Hồ Chí Minh qtd. in IDP 1969 12). As for Vietnam, it was “determined to fight the American aggressors until total victory” and thereby “fulfill its obligations” to not only “its own nation” but also “its friends in the fight against imperialism and colonialism, for independence of liberty” (12). In fighting US imperialist forces in Southeast Asia, Vietnam hoped to weaken US imperialism’s capacity to suppress liberation movements in other parts of the world. Conversely, in December of the same year, Arafat argued that Palestinians were fighting not only for themselves but for “the freedom of peoples who are fighting for their liberty and existence, the freedom of the people of Vietnam who are suffering like the people of Palestine, the freedom of all humanity from oppression, discrimination and exploitation” (“Speech” qtd. in IDP 1969 834; emphasis...
Vietnamese and Palestinian liberation fighters thus imagined themselves as part of a larger interconnected struggle against Western imperialism, unsubordinated to Soviet expansionism.

The direct impact that Vietnamese pressure on American forces in Vietnam had on American foreign policy in the Middle East is hard to quantify; however, sometimes US politicians inadvertently admitted that a weakening of American imperialist forces on one front benefited the national liberation struggle on the other. For example, in a 12 July 1970 television interview, US Senator Stuart Symington, chairman of the Foreign Relations Subcommittee on the Middle East, speculated that Nixon’s “hand [was] being forced somewhat in the Middle East as a result of our stalemate, you might say, in the Far East” (Symington qtd. in IDP 1970 215). As much as the American administration tried to compartmentalize its foreign policy initiatives in Vietnam and Palestine, disaggregating efforts to curb Soviet influence in Southeast Asia from similar efforts in the Middle East, the respective leaders of these struggles articulated commonalities and vowed to fight on each others’ behalf.

Such rhetorical and geopolitical connections that evidenced emergent Third World Liberation solidarities could also produce unintended results, however. Frustrated by its defeat in Vietnam, the United States would redouble its efforts in the Middle East, anxiously proving its imperial might at the expense of Palestinian liberation. Analyzing American cultural production from 1972 to 1980, Melani McAlister argues that for the US, “Israel, or a certain image of Israel, came to function as a stage upon which the war in Vietnam was refought—and this time, won” (159). Attributing the US defeat in Vietnam to a failure of political will, American conservatives, inspired by Israel’s brazen capture of the West Bank and Gaza during the 1967 Six-Day War, asserted that the US should act “not only with Israel but also like Israel on key international issues” (McAlister 158; original emphasis). In Peace in the Middle East? Reflections on Justice and Nationhood, Jewish American intellectual, prominent anti-Vietnam War activist, and stalwart supporter of Palestine, Noam Chomsky, makes a parallel though critical observation, suggesting that the US saw Israel as a “sort of magic slate rewrite of American failure in Vietnam” (Said 93). Although Palestinian American scholar Edward W. Said praises Chomsky’s high-profile, encyclopaedic critique of US and Israeli state violence, he points to a stark elision in Chomsky’s book, and in American
discourse more broadly: an attention to Palestinian subjectivity. Too often, American debates regarding US support of Israel elide the history and agency of the Palestinian freedom fighters, let alone their solidarities with other Third World Liberation struggles around the globe.

“Divine Sorrow”: How the Past Affects the Present

Although the Cold War era of Third World Liberation has passed, Vietnam and Palestine’s entangled histories of solidarity continue to haunt the present, flashing up in moments of contingency, to be seized if one knows where and how to look (Benjamin 255). Such histories are embodied in lived experiences, and when re-articulated in the present, they must contend with the current political landscape and its reordering of global alliances. Interested in how the experience of growing up during the Cold War, Third World Liberation movement has influenced his contemporary articulations of Vietnam-Palestine solidarity, I interviewed Ambassador Saadi Salama in July 2015 at the Embassy of the State of Palestine in Hanoi. Born in Palestine in the early 1960s, Salama witnessed the 1967 Six-Day War, developed a lifelong interest in Vietnam, and today advocates on behalf of Vietnam-Palestine relations, re-invoking the Third World Liberation rhetoric of the 1967–75 period in the post–Đoˆªi Mồ́i, post-Oslo present. His story offers tools for understanding the complex temporal entanglements underwriting Vietnam’s celebration of the International Year of Solidarity with the Palestinian People (IYSPP) in 2014.

On 7 June 1967, an Israeli military tank invaded Salama’s Palestinian village, located on the outskirts of Hebron. Although just six years old, he knew his life was about to be turned upside down. “They’re occupying everything,” he recalls thinking at the time. “They’re interfering in every single activity of our life” (Salama). Four years later, in the summer of 1971, Salama sold newspapers in Hebron’s bustling city centre. Each day, he purchased ten newspapers for the price of nine; he sold nine and kept one to read. Images from the Vietnam War covered the front pages of the news. As he looked at the white faces of the American soldiers, the military uniforms, and the ominous tanks, he was struck by the visual parallels with his own life under occupation: the fair-skinned faces of the Israeli soldiers, the uniformed men, the M3 half-tracks. It was then and there, at age ten in Hebron, that Salama first recognized the connections between Vietnam and Palestine: “I started to realize that we both—as Palestinian and Vietnamese—are victims.”
Palestinians’ identification with the Vietnamese struggle against the Americans permeated throughout Salama’s social life. For example, he remembers organizing mini soccer games in a small yard, in which one team would be “Vietnam” and the other “America.” The spectators rooted for the Vietnamese team and booed when the American team won. As he grew up, Salama retained a keen interest in Vietnam, “reading about the guerrilla fighters, and about the massacres, and about 1972 when the Americans started to bombard Vietnam” (Salama). The photos of those killed in the massacres made him and his fellow countrymen “really very upset.” They cheered when Vietnam ultimately won the war, though, expressing great happiness and hope for their own prolonged battle for liberation.

Salama never dreamed he would get the opportunity to visit Vietnam. But when he was in secondary school, he won a scholarship to study abroad. Although he also received invitations from Romania and Italy, Salama chose Vietnam: he wanted to see the land that he had fervently read about in the newspapers. It was his first time travelling outside of Palestine. After flying through Moscow, he arrived in Vietnam on 14 October 1980.

Despite some initial mishaps—the inability at first to understand anyone, confusion about how to use a mosquito net, cultural differences regarding the temperature of drinking water—Salama quickly fell in love with Vietnam and its language, culture, and traditions. After four years of studying in Vietnam, he was appointed as the second in command for a Palestinian mission in Laos, where he spoke Vietnamese with Laotian leaders. He returned to Vietnam during the period of Đổi Mới reforms, witnessing the societal effects of Vietnam’s accelerated transition to a socialist-oriented free-market economy. In 1992, he left Vietnam to develop his diplomatic career, only to return in 2010 to serve as Ambassador of the State of Palestine. Today, Salama feels at home in Vietnam: “I assure you I never feel that I am living in a foreign country . . . I’m happy that I am among a few foreigners who speak the language here, and I enjoy speaking the language” (Salama). Furthermore, he feels a lot of personal “responsibility” toward Vietnam, since he married a Vietnamese woman and his children “have Vietnamese blood.” Salama declares that throughout his life, he has never turned down “any possibilities that enables me to develop the relation between not only Vietnam and Palestine, but also Vietnam and the Arab world.”
In public speeches and writings, Salama asserts that Vietnam’s post-war advances continue to inspire Palestine: “Viet Nam’s achievements in the course of industrialization and modernization have been an enormous encouragement for Palestinian people to remain determined and keep faith with the future independence of their homeland” (qtd. in “VN Push”). But given the increasing normalization of relations with Israel outlined at the beginning of this article, are these political gestures merely nostalgic expressions of an earlier Third World Liberation moment, out of place and time? The Vietnamese State has an incentive to continually express rhetorical “solidarity” with Palestine: such gestures project Communist/anti-imperialist credibility to mask its current capitalist aspirations. However, such rhetorical overtures do not translate into material connections in the present: Vietnam does not exchange goods or labour with Palestine directly, nor does it provide financial support for the Palestinian liberation struggle.

Yet in an IYSPP speech celebrating the International Day for Solidarity with the Palestinian People on 28 November 2014, Salama insists that Vietnam’s “solidarity and friendship given to Palestine’s legitimate struggle over decades has become a strong motivation for the two countries to overcome geographical distances to get closer and further promote this special friendship” (“Speech”). The “Vietnam” that Salama imagines and calls forth when he talks about Vietnam-Palestine solidarity in the present is, however, perhaps less the contemporary neo-liberal State of Vietnam than it is the pre-1975 revolutionary ideal imagined by Hồ Chí Minh. This is a “Vietnam” associated more with what postcolonial theorist Neferti Tadiar coins the “divine sorrow” (378) of war, oppression, and revolutionary struggle than it is with post-1975 sentiments of victory, forward progress, and capitalist development.

Tadiar asserts the political utility of negative affects like sorrow, which connote a refusal to forget or “get over” the pain or violence of the past. According to the current Communist Party in Vietnam, 1975 marked a moment of revolutionary victory: independence from American imperialism and the fulfilment of the late Hồ Chí Minh’s Communist plan. However, the concept of “divine sorrow” entails a rejection of this state-sponsored narrative of teleological success—which works to silence critiques of the current Vietnamese government’s human rights abuses and curtail other political imaginaries—in favour of pre-1975 Third World Liberationist revolutionary promise. “Promise” here refers to the radical potentiality
of multiplicitous revolutionary futures, too soon foreclosed by the Vietnamese State’s monopolistic consolidation of the revolution into what Nguyễn-vô Thu-hương in this special issue calls a “national singular.” Therefore, rather than interpreting contemporary solidarity rhetoric as untimely expressions of nostalgia—connoting a political project out of time and place—I suggest we read them as “cultural resources of the living past that continue to bear radical political potentials for unfinished imaginations of revolution in the present” (Tadiar 378). That is, in order to draw connections between the unfinished revolution in Palestine and post-1975 Vietnam, contemporary solidarity rhetoric depends on an earlier historical moment of Vietnamese revolutionary promise, prior to Vietnam’s neo-liberal state-building project of privileging trade with Israel over commitments to Palestine. It is this invocation of pre-1975 revolutionary promise in the present that suggests that it is not only Palestine’s but also Vietnam’s revolution that may actually be “unfinished,” thus opening up a space to hold the current Vietnamese government accountable to its own pre-1975 revolutionary ideals. In this, I do not mean to uncritically romanticize these ideals but rather to suggest that they do offer “cultural resources” for those hoping to historicize social justice work. By invoking Vietnam-Palestine solidarities in the present, Saadi Salama and contemporary Vietnamese and Palestinian activists have the potential to not only support the ongoing struggle for liberation in Palestine but also re-chart the political possibilities of those nation-states that have seemingly concluded their own national revolutions, such as Vietnam. Rather than aligning with Israel as a means to curry favour with the United States, Vietnam may instead recall—remember and summon forth—the Third World Liberation movement’s legacy of decolonial, anti-racist, pro-Indigenous struggle. Contemporary expressions of Third World solidarity with Palestine would thus become moments of “critical nostalgia”: temporal entanglements that open up alternative futures for nation-states seemingly trapped in a neo-liberal teleology.

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Notes

1 A note regarding terms: during this period, “Vietnam” was divided between Communist North Vietnam, led by Hồ Chí Minh, and democratic South Vietnam, backed by the United States. Both sides conceived of themselves as legitimate national liberation movements, just with different political visions for the country. In this article, however, “Vietnam” often refers implicitly to Communist North Vietnam, since the Vietnamese liberation struggle that Palestine and the Third World Liberation movement identified with was that led by the North. Note though that Communists also infiltrated the South via the National Liberation Front (NLF) and the Việt Cộng. Because I am primarily citing English-language sources, I have chosen to go with the anglicized spelling of “Vietnam” rather than the Vietnamese “Việt Nam.” Some archival documents alternatively use the hybrid notation “Viet Nam,” which I have reproduced faithfully.

2 Translated from the original Vietnamese: Ủy ban Liên chính phủ và hợp tác Kinh tế, thương mại, KHCN và hợp tác trong các lĩnh vực khác.

3 Zionist settler colonialism is built upon the fiction that Palestine was a “land without people for a people without a land.” For a critique of this narrative, see Alan George’s “‘Making the Desert Bloom’: A Myth Examined” (88).

4 It is important to note that the settler colonial foundation of Israel was not a singular event but rather part of a longer structure, stretching back to the days of Ottoman rule and forward into the present. For more on this history, see Patrick Wolfe, “Purchase by Other Means: Dispossessing the Natives in Palestine,” in Traces of History (203–38).

5 In 1964, the Arab League initiated the creation of the PLO, whose stated mission was the liberation of Palestine through armed struggle. Ahmad Shukeiri served as the first chairman of the PLO Executive Committee. Yasser Arafat led the PLO from 1969 until his death in 2004. The PLO is an umbrella organization encompassing numerous political parties and organizations such as Fatah (Palestinian National Liberation Movement), established as a political party in 1965 by Arafat, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP),
founded in 1967 by George Habash. In 1974, the Arab League recognized the PLO as “the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people,” and the United Nations invited the PLO to the General Assembly as a representative of the Palestinian people. After the signing of the Oslo Accords with Israel in 1993, the PLO’s official policy shifted from one of armed struggle to one of negotiation and diplomacy.

I draw from Rey Chow’s theorization of entanglements as the “fuzzing-up of conventional classificatory categories due to the collapse of neatly maintained epistemic borders” (10), attending to her caution that entanglements might “be about partition and disparity rather than about conjunction and similarity” (2).

“Post-Oslo” refers to the period after the Oslo Accords. Signed in Washington, DC, in 1993 and then in Taba in 1995, the Oslo Accords are a set of two agreements between the government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Although they did not lead to the establishment of a Palestinian State, the accords did create the Palestinian Authority, which wields limited governmental powers over the West Bank and Gaza. Many critique the Oslo Accords for normalizing Israeli occupation and selling short the promise of national liberation. For a more sustained analysis of the Oslo Accords and the response of resistant youth, see Sunaina Maira’s Jil Oslo.

For work on the United States’ relationship with Vietnam, see, for example, Marita Sturken’s Tangled Memories, Marilyn B. Young’s The Vietnam Wars, 1945–1990, Yén Lè Espiritu’s Body Counts, and Viet Thanh Nguyen’s Nothing Ever Dies. For work on the United States’ relationship with Palestine, see William B. Quandt’s Decade of Decisions, Melani McAlister’s Epic Encounters, and Keith Feldman’s A Shadow Over Palestine.

A note regarding citations: many of the documents archived and anthologized by the Institute of Palestine Studies (IPS) in the annual International Documents on Palestine (IDP) anthologies have been previously published. In order to credit IPS’s editorial work, to which I am indebted, these documents will be cited as “qtd. in IDP . . .” with the year of the anthology and the anthology’s page number following. For original publication information, see the full citations in the Works Cited section.

For more about the rise of area studies during the Cold War and concerns regarding its continual relevance in the academy, see Learning Places, edited by Masao Miyoshi and Harry Harootunian; The Politics of Knowledge, edited by David Szanton; and Remaking Area Studies, edited by Terence Wesley-Smith and Jon Goss.

Rabab Abdulhadi and Dana M. Olwan’s 2015 forum in American Quarterly on “Shifting Geographies of Knowledge and Power: Palestine and American Studies” does important work in centring Palestine
solidarity as an important question for American Studies. For the most part, however, it too limits its conception of what such solidarity could look like to a binary US-Palestine framework.

12 English-language publications have only recently begun to chart South-South relations. In *Asia as Method*, Kuan-Hsing Chen asserts the importance of “inter-referencing” between East Asian countries for the contemporary project of decolonization, de-imperialization, and the intellectual dismantling of Cold War logic in the region. However, because his project does not include Southeast Asia or West Asia, it does not leave room to imagine Vietnam-Palestine relations. Likewise, Argentine philosopher of liberation Enrique Dussel theorized a trans-modern “pluriverse” that privileged South-South dialogues, though his work has largely been taken up in the field of literary and cultural studies, rather than in the archival analysis of political rhetoric (López-Calvo 1). Olivia C. Harrison’s *Transcolonial Maghreb* is notable for its analysis of South-South relations via a study of how Moroccan, Algerian, and Tunisian writers engaged the question of Palestine.

13 “Secondary literature” here refers particularly to the work of Chamberlin, Feldman, Klinghoffer, Lubin, McAlister, Nassar, and Pennock.

14 One notable exception is Paul Thomas Chamberlin’s *The Global Offensive*, which I will cite throughout this article.

15 “Post–Đoˆªi Môi’” refers to the period after the 1986 economic reforms created to transform Vietnam into a “socialist-oriented market economy.” The reforms are critiqued for initiating the current culture of rampart capitalism and increased inequality present in Vietnam today. For more on “post-Oslo,” see note 7.

16 For more on how the current human rights regime was built on the ruins of earlier political utopias, see Samuel Moyn’s *The Last Utopia*. Moyn charts how international law became the dominant social justice alternative to popular struggle and revolutionary Communism post-1968. For more on the increasing diplomatic relationships between Israel and India, see Vijay Prashad’s *Namaste Sharon*.

17 On 17 May 1948, the Soviet Union became the first country to legally recognize the newly established State of Israel. However, Israel’s relations with Moscow soon deteriorated, and the Soviet Union pivoted support to the Arab nations instead, providing them with arms and military resources. During the War of Attrition (1967–70), the Soviet Union stationed fighter pilots in Egypt, who engaged in combat with the Israeli Air Force. The Soviet Union also strongly denounced Zionism in its propaganda.

18 For more on the relationship between American liberalism and Israeli Zionism in the 1965–80 period, see Keith Feldman’s *A Shadow Over Palestine*. 
19 This is also reflected in publications of the American New Left, such as the Berkeley Barb. In an article titled “Catch 8½,” published in the 30 June–6 July 1967 issue, the publication “compared the Israeli military to the defiant underdog Viet Cong while likening the future and corrupt Arab armies to the U.S. military” (Pennock 94).

20 See also the “Statement of Policy” released by the First International Convention for the Support of the Palestinian People, originally published in Al-Sha’b (Algiers), 30 December 1969: “Zionism is a racialist, expansionist and colonialist system that is inseparable from world imperialism, headed by the United States. It is a tool in the hands of world imperialism, directed not only against the Palestinian people but all Arab peoples and other national liberation movements in the world as well” (First International Convention for the Support of the Palestinian People qtd. in IDP 1969 835).

21 For a more thorough critique of this binary Cold War framework, see Heonik Kwon’s The Other Cold War.

22 The Peking Review is known for its strong propaganda rhetoric in support of Maoism and the “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.”

23 See, for example, the interview granted by Dr. George Habash, Secretary-General of the Central Committee for the PFLP, to a United Press Correspondent, 4 March 1969 (Habash, “Interview” qtd. in IDP 1969 630–1).


26 See, for example, the “1970 Resolutions of the Seventh Session of the Palestinian National Assembly,” printed in IDP 1970; “Joint Communiqué Issued on the Occasion of the PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat’s visit to Yugoslavia,” reprinted in IDP 1972; “Statement by the Palestine People’s Conference Affirming the Unity of the Arab and Palestine Liberation Movements and Urging the Arab States to Sever Relations with Jordan,” reprinted in IDP 1972; “Communiqué issued by the Second Conference of the General Union of Palestinian Women,” printed in IDP 1974.

27 For more references to a “second Vietnam,” see also Arafat, “Press Conference Statements on the Situation in Jordan” in IDP 1970; and

Although it saw itself as a non-aligned state, Israel was not invited to the Bandung Conference because it “had the reputation of being too beholden to the colonial powers and insufficiently driven by the dynamic on anti-colonialism” (Prashad, Namaste 13).


For more on how Palestine resonates in the global consciousness, see John Collins’s “Global Palestine.”


For more on “critical nostalgia,” see J. A. Brown-Rose’s Critical Nostalgia and Caribbean Migration; and Ray Cashman’s “Critical Nostalgia and Material Culture in Northern Ireland.”

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